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Abstract
The thesis studies the relationship between the fabrication of evidence and corruption
decision of the Agent. To further study the e¤ects of above mentioned fabrication of evidence
event, the thesis also analyzes the e¤ect of supervision and incentive scheme organization,
within a three layer hierarchial system on corruption. We analyze both pure and mixed
Nash Equlibrium strategies. The thesis analyze both non-cooperative and cooperative game
structures. In cooperative games, we have also tackled the relationship between the ex-ante
and ex-post collusion proof incentive schemes.
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Özet
Bu tezde oyuncular¬n yolsuzluk kararlar¬ile yolsuzlu¼ga ait kan¬tlar¬n yeniden üretilmesine
aras¬ndaki ili¸ski incelenmi¸stir. Bu ili¸skiyi inceleyebilmek için yolsuzs¸u¼ga ili¸skin kan¬tlar¬n
yeniden üretilmesi ile birlikte, denetim ve tes¸vik planlar¬n¬n organizasyonunda yolsuzluk
karar¬üzerindeki etkisi aras¸t¬r¬lm¬¸st¬r. Bu tezde, hem anlas¸mal¬hem de anlas¸mas¬z Nash
dengeleri tart¬¸s¬lm¬¸st¬r. Anlas¸mal¬Nash dengeleri çal¬¸s¬rken, önceden karar vrilmi ve oyun
sonras¬yap¬lan muvazaa aras¬nda, tes¸vik yap¬land¬rmas¬aç¬s¬ndan, ili¸ski incelenmi¸stir.
Anahtar Sözcükler: yolsuzluk, yolsuzluk kan¬t¬, yeniden üretme, denetim, tes¸vik, muvazaa
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1 Introduction
There are many di¤erent denitions provided for corruption and corrupt behavior. The
most recognizable and well known example of corruption is the public o¢ cials accepting
bribes for permit or licence. However, one should note that corruption includes individual
oppurtunistic behavior such as shirking on the job,absenteeism and favoring friends and
relatives in recruitment and promotion1. So, we can broadly dene corruption as adaptation
of individual oppurtunistic behavior for private gain.
Corruption is usually modeled in Principal-Agent relationships and it is mainly the agent
who is engaged in the corrupt behavior. A public o¢ cer who has discretionary power on
distributing a permit or a licence can engage in corruption by accepting bribes. A worker
in a factory can engage in corrupt behavior by exerting low e¤ort levels or taking leaves
of absence frequently. Moreover, the secrecy of corrupt behavior causes a hidden action
problem.
The hidden action problem entails two sub-problems. In a framework where hidden ac-
tion is observed,monitoring becomes substantially important. The Principal either performs
monitoring herself or delegate monitoring duty to an independent supervisor. Monitoring
requires a costly technology and the technology adopted is imperfect. Notwithstanding the
necessity of monitoring in hidden action enviroment, note that there are some cases, pure
strategy Nash Equlibria where the Agent is corrupt with probability one, the Principal does
not need to monitor.Under the assumption that the technology adopted for monitoring is
costly, the Principal simply does not prefer monitoring, either conducted by herself or su-
pervisor. On the other hand, even under a costly monitoring technology, the Principal may
always prefer monitoring to be conducted. To induce monitoring, the Principal sets high
penalties for not monitoring.
The second sub-problem that needs to be dealt in hidden action enviroment is the estab-
lishment of incentive schemes. In our framework, we deal with incentive schemes. Incentive
schemes are designed to provide "incentives" for the agent to perform an desired action.
Incentive schemes are designed under considerations such as; the incremental benets, i.e.
payo¤s, prots, created by additional e¤ort, the precision with which the desired activi-
1Bac,M. "Corruption, Supervision and the Structure of Hierarchies" Journal of Law,Economics and Or-
ganization 1996
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tiesare assessed, the agents risk tolerance and the agents responsiveness to incentives. The
Principal always prefers the agent who is honest and hard working, however she does not
always prefer to induce that kind of behavior. Additional e¤ort is costly, so to create incre-
mental benets high incentive schemes are needed to be o¤ered. On the other hand, any
kind of corruption causes harm to the principal. So as the harm done by the corruption
increases, the principals preference on inducing desired behavior also changes.Assessment of
the agents output is based on the monitoring e¤ort exerted, either monitoring is performed
by the principal or the supervisor. If the monitoring is performed by the supervisor, then
the principal may prefer to o¤er incentive schemes that will induce monitoring behavior.
However, we assume that monitoring technology adopted is costly, so the incentive scheme
o¤ered to the supervisor should compensate the cost inicted due to monitoring. All the
players in the game are assumed to be risk neutral in our framework. To answer the question
of how to design optimal incentive schemes in order to prevent corruption is one of the main
objectives of the thesis.
The thesis is mostly related to literature on corruption and monitoring. We contribute
to the literature in a way that we link the fabrication of evidence event to the corruption
literature. In corruption literature there are mainly two types of outcomes that can be
reached at the end of the Principal-Agent game, i.e. corrupt or honest, high output, low
output etc.. The game we modeled in the thesis has three outcomes, which are referred as
"corruption evidences". There are three outcomes, corruption evidences, in the game: hard,
soft and no evidence. Hard evidence is non-deniable indicator of corruption. Soft evidence
on the other hand has links to corruption with positive probability but it is not a denite
sign of corruption. There exists also a positive probability that soft evidence can be reached
even if the agent is not corrupt. No evidence as name suggests contains no information on
the action of the agent. No evidence can be reached whether the agent is corrupt or not,
and/or whether the supervisor monitors or not.
Fabrication of evidence event can be observed when a supervisor who chooses to moni-
tor reaches no evidence. Since monitoring technology is imperfect a monitoring supervisor
reaches, with positive probability, to no evidence outcome. At that point of the game, super-
visor may present no evidence, with some additional traits, as soft evidence to the principal.
So soft evidence by nature can be fabricated. Also, the principal cannot distinguish between
a real soft evidence and a fabricated one. On the other hand, the supervisor, unless it is a
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pure strategy Nash Equlibria, can not di¤erentiate between "no evidence" outcomes. That
is to say, when he observes no evidence outcome, he does not know whether the agent is
corrupt or not. In that case, when the supervisor decides upon fabricating evidence with
positive probability he will be framing an honest agent. Although, soft evidence is not a
denite sign of corruption it still brings disutility to a honest agent. Also, we introduce a
monetary equivalent of harm done both to the honest agent and the principal by fabrication
of evidence.
The thesis tries to link fabrication evidence to corruption literature in order to analyze the
e¤ect of fabrication on agents corruption decision. Like monitoring technology fabrication
of evidence is also costly. The fabrication of evidence event makes the soft evidence incentive
scheme payments more likely. Our intutiton has been that given the fabrication of evidence,
the agent decides upon honesty. And also we try to analyze the cost reducing e¤ects, if there
are any, of fabrication. We try to analyze if there exists a cost reduction for any outcome
that the principal may prefer to induce.
Also, collusion is common phenomenon is principal-agent relationship. The agent and the
supervisor can cooperate if there exists an additional surplus, created by cooperation, that
is to be shared. The principals incentive scheme in that case, in addition to all those above,
also includes collusion-proofness. We examined two types of collusion, ex-ante and ex-post.
Ex-ante collusion is an agreement between the supervisor and the agent that requires not
monitoring decision from the supervisor. Whereas, ex-post collusion proofness is an aggre-
ment where the supervisor reports no evidence when he reaches hard or soft evidence.Then,
we try to see if there exists a relationship between ex-ante and ex-post collusion.
While continuing with the results and characterizations we have provided within the
thesis, we would like to remind you that all the results and characterization we have provided
are structured by the assumptions we have made, enviroment we have created.
1.1 Literature Review
In this section, we discuss the related literature on corruption, incentives,hierarchy and
fabrication in order to highlight the contribution of the present thesis. In our framework,
we introduce the fabrication of "corruption evidence". While we know of no paper in which
the issue of fabrication of corruption evidence, there are many separate theoretical studies
of corruption and fabrication. We discuss a selection from these papers belows.
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Sah and Stiglitz (1986) studies the e¤ect of organization of the decision-making units
together on the performance of an economic system or organization.The paper called this
organization of decision making units as "architecture". The architecture is dened as the
description how the constituent decision-making units are arranged together in a system,
how the decision-making authority and ability is distributed within a system, who gathers
what information, and who communicates what with whom. There are two specic architec-
tures studied in the paper,polyarchy and hierarchy. A polyarchy is an architecture, in which
there are several, and possibly competing, decision makers who can undertake projects inde-
pendently of one another. That kind of architecture is considered feasible in market-oriented
economies. On the other hand, a hierarchy is a concentrated model, where a group of indi-
viduals, or sometimes only one individual, can undertake projects while the others provide
support in decision making. That architecture is considered feasible for bureaucracy-oriented
economy. The paper mainly focuses on the e¤ect of choice of architecture on the quality of
decision making. That is to say, how individuals are arranged a¤ects the nature of the errors
made by the economic system.They exemplify their research question as follows; in a market
economy, if one mr rejects a protable idea, there is a possibility that some other rm might
accept it. In constrast, if a single bureau makes such decisions then the idea remains unused.
The logic works both ways of course. Their analysis is based on a technology, which has
two important central features: the costs of acquiring and communicating information and
limited capabilities of individuals to gather,absorb and process information within a limited
amount of time.Next,they provide a model of the decision structure within a polyarchy and
a hierarchy. Then, they continue their analysis under the assumption that the nature of an
individuals errors and the mix of available projects is exogenous, and analyze the relative
performance of the architectures under these assumptions. Finally, the analysis compare the
relative performance of the architectures with regards to collection and processing of infor-
mation. They conclude that their analysis provides insight for the arguments on the relative
merits of polyarchies vs the hierarchies. They provide the assesment of the circumstances
under which one architecture is better than the other.
Following the discussion on the e¤ect of design of organizational systems on (economic)
systemsperformance, Yingyi Qian (1994) studies the incentives and loss of control in a
hierarchy model. In the model, the levels of e¤ort from managers and workers, the wage
scales, the span of control and the total number of tiers are all endogenous. The analysis
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raised in the paper is based on the determination of hierarchial tiers, the span of control, i.e.
the number of subordinates under the same supervisor and the wage scales in the hierarchy
under an organizational design problem. The amount of capital and the state of technology
are taken as given. The paper provides a model for an economic organization that owns a
capital stock,K, and uses a hierarchy to control the production.A superior can be in charge
of one or more subordinates, however to simplify the analysis subordinates have only one
superior. The superior monitors the subordinates e¤ort level, which is either zero or one,
in the second part of the analysis the paper analyze the continous e¤ort scheme also. The
superiors monitoring technology requires only time and no e¤ort.When the superior monitors
the subordinate, the e¤ort level can be known precisely. However, the superior has limited
time,i.e. the superior can monitor his subordinates with a probability, P<1. The paper
concludes with two main results, under a specic monitoring and production technology.
First, in the optimal hierarchy in which all managers and workers are identical ex-ante,wages
fall and e¤orts decrease as one moves from the top to the bottom of the hierarchy. Second, as
the size of the hierarchy increases both the e¤orts and wages of managers at the top increase
because their marginal product increases, and both the e¤orts and wages of workers fall
because their marginal product decreases. Hence, the wage ratio between the top managers
and workers increases.This result implies a greater loss of control for a bigger hierarchy.
The enviroment analyzed in the thesis requires adoptation of hierarchial architecture. We
established a three layer hierarchial setting composed of the Principal, the Supervisor and
the Agent. Also, there is only one principal, one supervisor and one agnent in the game.
So, span of control is not an issue in the game. However, further studies may include more
than one supervisor, in either hierarchy and poliarchy architectures, and also more than one
agent to analyze the e¤ect of incentive schemes and fabrication of evidence on corruption.
Mehmet Bac (1996) studies the relation between monitoring and corruption under di¤er-
ent hierarchies.In order to understand the relation between structure of the hierarchy and the
corruption,the incentive structure, wages and rewards, are exogenous. Exogenous incentive
structure entails the same wages for all agents and same rewards for all supervisors. The
monitoring technology choice is of great importance to understand the relationship between
a monitoring hierarchy and corruption. There are two polar types of monitoring technology:
public and private. The former is simultaneous monitoring of a group of subordinates by su-
pervisor. The latter is monitoring of a particular subordinates by supervisor. As stated in the
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paper besides the monitoring technology, another relevant issue is the nature of corruption.
External corruption, referring to transactions between a member of the organization and
an outsider. Then, the paper introduces the second kind of corruption,internal corruption.
Internal corruption is dened as an implicit agreement, whereby the subordinates transfer a
portion of proceeds from external corruption to the upper levels.Internal corruption allows
for a type collusion eliminating the monitoring in the hierarchy. Last but not least, the paper
provides as with the nature of hierarchial structure. The at hierarchy refers to minimal
one rank extension that consists of a supervisor at the top and a group of subordinates who
are monitored at the bottom. The steep hierarchy, on the other hand, is maximal one rank
extension in which each supervisor monitors only one subordinate. Given the monitoring
technology, the trade o¤ is between the external and internal corruption in at and steep
hierarchial structures. The paper concludes that under public monitoring external corrup-
tion is less likely in a at hierarchy than a steep one. However, under public monitioring
at hierarchy is more susceptible to internal corruption than steep hierarchy. For private
monitoring, since monitoring costs increases as the monitoring e¤orts increases, supervisors
monitoring incentive is so low that all subordinates are corrrupt in at hierarchy. The type
of monitoring technology does not matter for steep hierarchy.
Ronald Strausz (1997) paper di¤ers from the rest of the literature we have been reviewed
from its structure in monitoring. The paper studies a principal-agent relationship in which
either the principal or a supervisor can monitor the agents hidden action by the use of
identical monitoring technology. So, the question is whether the principal should delegate
its monitoring duty or not. The problem is analysed in a simple agency setting with hidden
action. Costly monitoring of the agents action is possible and can be performed by either the
principal or an independent supervisor. There are two important assumptions on monitoring
technology; monitoring is not veriable and monitoring signals are private information.The
paper concludes that delegation of monitoring is protable. This results is due to rst the
assumption that monitoring is non-veriable and therefore non-contractable transforms the
principal-agent problem into a problem with double moral hazard. Apart from inducing
the agent to take high e¤ort level, the principal needs also a set appropriate incentives to
induce monitoring, as the agent will not choose a high e¤ort level if monitoring does not take
place. The principal, therefore, has to create two types of incentives. When the principal
does not delegate monitoring, she has only one contract through which she can regulate
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both incentives.If the principal does delegate monitoring, then she has also the contract
of the supervisor by which she can create incentives. The paper concludes that with two
contracts the principal is able to regulate the two incentives more accurately and nd that
the delegation has an incentive e¤ect. Second reason for the protability of the delegation of
monitoring is the assumption that information, which is obtained from monitoring process,
is private. The private nature of the information implies that the monitor has to decide
whether to reveal information or not. This causes delegation to have a commitment e¤ect.
The paper shows that when the principal delegates monitoring,it is optimal for her to use a
carrot and stick approach to induce the agent to take the right action. When the principal
monitors, she is reluctant to deliver the carrots, i.e. she is reluctant to reveal the information
gathered from monitoring when the e¤ort level of agent is high. When the principal employs
an independent supervisor, she will be able to use carrot-stick approach optimally.
The thesis mainly follows the environment described Strauszs paper. The thesis studies a
principal-agent relationship alike, however unlike Strauszs paper, the thesis studies whether
the monitoring is always necessary or not. The outcomes of the game in Strauszs paper
is twofold: high e¤ort outcome and low e¤ort outcome. The outcomes are stochastic, and
also exerting high e¤ort does not necessarily mean that the outcome realized is going to be
high e¤ort outcome. The thesis follows the same logic, with three outcomes, and realization
and/or fabrication of soft evidence even when the agent is honest.
All those papers we have mentioned above incorporated Cooperative Nash Equilibrium as
well as Non-Cooperative Nash Equilibrium. One of the most prominent papers on collusion
is by Tirole (1986). The paper derives its motivation from sociological studies of collusive
behavior in organizations. Sociological studies in the area state that collusive behavior is
predicted by the analysis of group as well as individual incentives. In his paper, Tirole
incorporates information economics into that sociological theory. The paper also borrows
from the principal-agent paradigm of the information economics. This paradigm emphasizes
the productive ine¢ ciency associated iwth asymmetric information and insurance motives.
The theme of paper, however, is that the analysis of the hierarchial structures does not boil
down to a compounding of the basic ine¢ cieny, due to the fact that going from the simple two-
tier principal/agent structure to more complex ones introduces the possibility of collusion.
The paper, on the other hand, views an organization as a network of contracts that interplay
rather than as a single contract. The paper concludes that collusive behavior decrease the
7
e¢ ciency of the hierarchial structure. So, collusive behavior must be fought through incentive
mechanisms. However, then the paper remarks the reader that that conclusion is extreme.
Sometimes, the side transfers exist because the organization needs them to sustain long-term
relationship in all levels of hierarchies.
Following the Tiroles 1986 paper, Bac and Kucuksenel (2005) extend the model of
hierarchy by incorporating the relationship between ex-ante and ex-post collusion and the
supervisors monitoring incentives. The paper di¤ers from the collusion model presented in
Tiroles by the introduction of the supervision costs and a new, ex-ante,occasion for collusion
whereby the supervisor stops monitoring for a transfer payment from the agent, in addition
to ex-post collusion possibilities conditional on the monitoring outcome. The paper conludes
that that ex-ante collusion and the supervisors incentive constraint can be ignored when
the monitoring costs are small and the probability of succesful detention is large. Also, to
prevent ex-ante collusion the principal increases the gap between the wages o¤ered when a
report is presented and not.
We follow the analysis done in the Bac and Kucuksenel(2005) paper. We analyze the
relationship between ex-post and ex-ante collusion. We try the answer the question, whether
the ex-post collusion proofness is su¢ cient to prevent ex-ante collusion.
Our paper introduces the notion of "framing" by fabrication of evidence in three layer
hierarchy modeling. One of the papers on framing is by Polinsky and Shavell (2000).The pa-
per mainly analyzes the corruption in law enforcement, the payment of bribes to enforcement
agents, threats to frame innocent individuals in order to extort money from them and the
actual framing of innocent individuals. The paper concludes that taking bribes and framing
should be penalized maximally, however extortion should not be penalized. This counter-
intuitive conclusion is due to the fact that, penalizing extortion either raises the expected
payment of innocent individuals if extortion is not deterred, or else induces enforcers to frame
rather than extort such individuals, in the model they have provided. If the assumptions of
the model has been changed, there is a chance that the conclusion can be changed.
The thesis is organized as follows. The next section presents the model in which we adress
the question "What are the optimal incentive schemes that should be introduced in three-
layer hierarchies". In Section 3, we begin our analysis under the absence of collusive behavior.
We characterize the optimal incentive scheme that has to be o¤ered to induce pure strategy
Nash equlibria, of the non-cooperative game. Then, we characterize the incentive schemes
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that induce desired behavior in mixed strategy Nash Equilibria of the non-cooperative game.
In section 4, we extend our analysis to collusive behavior. We follow the Bac and Ku-
cuksenel (2005) and introduce two types of collusion, ex-post and ex-ante collusion.
Section 5, concludes the thesis by summarizing the results we have discussed and extend-
ing more research questions in the topic.
2 Model
In the thesis we model the game in a three-layer hierarchial system.The highest ranking
player in the game is the Principal. The Principals objective is to minimize her expected
cost, which is composed of wages o¤ered to the supervisor and the agent under hard, soft
and no evidences. The Principal hires both the Supervisor and the Agent. The Supervisor
is hired by the Principal to perform monitoring. He decides between monitoring and not
monitoring actions. The Supervisor is able to observe and verify the outcomes of the game.
The Supervisors objective is to maximize his utility, which is the expected payo¤ he gets
from performing, induced, action. The lowest ranking player in the game is the Agent, and
he is also hired by the Principal. He can be either a public o¢ cial who distributes permits
and licences or a factory worker who is engaged in manufacturing. Just like, the Agents
objective is to maximize his expected utility.
An outcome in the interaction between the Supervisor and the Agent is dened as an "a
corruption evidence". Outcomes,i.e. types of corruption evidence,are observable an veri-
able. We distinguish between three types of evidence, according to their informativeness,or
reliability.The most reliable outcome is classied as hard evidence, which is a non-deniable in-
dicator of the corruption. Due to its unmistakable nature, hard evidence can only be reached
if the Supervisor monitors and the Agent is corrupt. The next outcome is the soft evidence,
which can be reached if the Supervisor monitors, (the Agent is corrupt or not).So, unlike
hard evidence, soft evidence cannot be regarded as a proof of corruption. The last outcome
is "no evidence", as the name suggests, evidence that has no information value,revealing
nothing new. The no evidence outcome can be reached as a result of any action taken by
the Supervisor and the Agent.
Below we introduce the notation and then describe the model and the sequence of the
events.In this hierarchy, the Principals wage payment can depend solely on the observ-
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able outcomes, i.e., evidence types, of which we have three. Thus, the incentive pack-
age can include three di¤erent wages for the Supervisor,wsh; w
s
s; w
s
n;, and three di¤erent
wages for the agent, wah;w
a
s ; w
a
n.Some of these variables are further explained in the analysis.
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wsh : High evidence wage for the Supervisor
wss : Soft/Fabricated evidence wage for the Supervisor
wsn : No evidence wage for the Supervisor
wah : Hard evidence wage for the Agent
was : Soft/Fabricated evidence wage for the Agent
wan : No evidence wage for the Agent
w0 : Common reservation wage for the Supervisor and the Agent normalized to 0
cm : Cost of monitoring for the Supervisor
cf : Cost of fabrication for the Supervisor
z : The Agents positive utility from corruption
h : The Principals negative utility from the Agents corruption
fa : Harm faced by an honest Agent in case of fabrication
fp : Harm faced by the Principal in case of framing of an non-corrupt Agent.
 : The probability of the Agent being corrupt
q1 :The probability of reaching hard evidence when the Agent is corrupt
q2 : The probabilty of reaching soft evidence when the Agent is corrupt
q3 : The probability of reaching no evidence when the Agent is corrupt
 : The probability of reaching soft evidence when the Agent is not corrupt.
It is natural to assume that harm done by the corruption is higher than the private benet
gained by the Agent by engaging in corruption. That is to say, the thesis analyzes the tools
and incentive schemes that may prevent or decrease the adoptation of corruption. Since we
are dealing with prevention, we clearly and naturally assume that corruption is "bad".
The probabilities, assigned by the nature, q1; q2 and q3 sums up to one. And the proba-
bilities of the Supervisor monitoring,p, and the Agent being corrupt, , is endegenous. They
are determined through the incentive schemes that the Principal o¤ers.
It is useful to assume that cm > cf . Once the Supervisor decides upon monitoring, he
bears the cost of monitoring, cm which is incurred due to monitoring technology. On the
other hand, once monitored with positive probability he reaches hard and soft evidence. If
he reaches no evidence, which is possible with probability q3 and decides upon fabricating
evidence he bears the cost of cf . That cost is smaller than cm because once the supervisor
monitors and reaches a evidence, no evidence, it is less costly to generate "new" evidence.
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That new evidence is soft, which can be reached by a monitoring supervisor whether the
Agent is corrupt or not.
The probabilities of the Supervisor monitoring and the Agent being corrupt can directly
been inuenced by the wage structure o¤ered by the Principal, whereas the probabalities of
hard,soft and no evidence are exogenous parameters that are dened by the nature.
The game starts with the Principals o¤er to both the Supervisor and the Agent. The
o¤er contains wages provided upon the outcomes of the game, hard,soft and no evidence.
The Supervisor and the Agent accept the o¤er if their participation constraints are satised.
The Principal also operates under a limited liability constraint: in no outcome of the game
can the Principal impose a positve transfer on the Supervisor and/or the Agent. In other
words, the wage payment must be non-negative.
The Principals objective is to minimize an expected cost expression, dened and stated
in the sequel, which includes expected wage payments and costs that arise from the actions
taken in the hierarchy.
The following is the sequence of events in the game.
 Principal o¤ers wage contracts,
 The Supervisor and the Agent accept or reject,
Then, if they both accept, the two play a simultaneous-move game in which the Su-
pervisor chooses to monitor the Agent or not, and the Agent chooses between corruption
and remaining honest. The outcome of this interaction is determined by the Nature and
is observed only by the Supervisor. If the outcome is "no evidence", the Supervisor msy
decide to fabricate soft evidence.Participation constraint satised the Supervisor and the
Agent opt to play a simultaneous move game. The Principals objective is to minimize her
costs by o¤ering the lowest possible wages to the Supervisor and the Agent that will induce
the desired behavior.
All payo¤s are measured in the same,common unit.The nal payo¤s in the game are
determined as follows:
The Supervisor, monitoring, will receive the payo¤s: wsh   cm, wss   cm and wsn   cm in
case of hard,soft and no evidence respectively.
The Supervisor,not monitoring, will receive the payo¤: wsn
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The corrupt Agent will receive the payo¤s; wah+ z, w
a
s + z and w
a
n+ z in case of hard,soft
and no evidence respectively.
The non-corrupt Agent will receive the payo¤s was and w
a
n under the monitoring Super-
visor.
If the Supervisor does not monitor, the payo¤ will be wan +z and w
a
n for the corrupt and
non-corrupt Agent respectively.
The Supervisor cannot reach undeniable indicator of the corruption,hard evidence, at all
times. The monitoring strategy is imperfect. After realization of the outcomes as a result of
the simultaneous move game, the Supervisor will move again if the outcome is; no evidence.
The Supervisor will decide whether to "fabricate" evidence or not.
Fabricating soft evidence to frame the Agent is a costly activity for the Supervisor.If the
Supervisor decides to fabricate evidence, he has to exert an e¤ort, cf > 0. The Supervisor
who monitors will reach "no evidence" with positive probability, q3 and 1    when the
Agent is corrupt and honest respectively. He will decide whether to fabricate or not, the
fabricated evidence will be classifed as "soft evidence". So both the corrupt and honest
Agent is susceptible framing. However, only the honest Agent will bear a disutility fa > 0
in monetary terms.The Principal cannot to identify between "fabricated" and "real" soft
evidence. Also, the Principal will face a disutility of fp > 0 in monetary terms when the
non-corrupt Agent is framed.
The payo¤ structure in case of fabrication will be as follows:
wss   cm   cf , was + z for the Supervisor and the corrupt Agent respectively
wss   cm   cf ,was   fa for the Supervisor and the non corrupt Agent respectively.
In the rst part of the analysis,we characterize the optimal wage structure in the absence
of collusive behavior.When the outcomes are realized, the Supervisor will submit a report,
i.e.announce the outcome to the Principal. He will not withhold information from the Princi-
pal in agreement with the Agent. He can however, fabricate evidence.We shall focus rst on
the Pure Strategy Nash Equlibria, then we will investigate optimal incentives and minimized
costs when the Supervisor, the Agent or both randomize.
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3 The Analysis in The Absence of Collusion
3.1 Pure Strategy Nash Equlibria
The most preferred outcome from the Principals perspective are:
{Monitor,Not Corrupt and Not Fabricate} or {Not Monitor, Not Corrupt and Not Fabri-
cate}. However, these cannot be identied as Nash Equilibrium of the monitoring-corruption
game, because the players, i.e. the Supervisor and the Agent, will be better of by deviating.
That is to say, the Supervisor, who monitors will deviate to not monitor strategy given that
the Agent is remaining honest. Also, the Agent, who is remaining honest will deviate to
corruption given that the Supervisor is not monitoring.
These observations leave us with two possible Nash Equilibria:
 {Monitor,Corrupt,Fabricate}
 {Monitor,Corrupt,Not Fabricate}
Clearly, if the Principals objective is to induce this equlibria, she can simply not hire the
Supervisor (who is ine¤ective here). It is also ine¢ cient to have an supervisor exert e¤ort
for absolutely no impact on the Agent.
Despite this fact, we shall solve the Principals problem with the Supervisor who monitors,
when the Agent is corrupt with the probability one, for he sake of completeness and illustrate
the mechanics of the problem at hand.
3.1.1 Inducing the Strategy {Monitor,Corrupt,Fabricate}
In this case, the Supervisor decides to monitor and, if he reaches the no evidence outcome,
he will fabricate evidence. On the other hand, the Agent chooses corruption. Given these
choices, the Principals expected cost will be as follows:
ECp : q1(w
s
h + w
a
h) + (q2 + q3)(w
s
s + w
a
s ) + h
The Supervisor and the Agents expected utilies and participation constraints are as
follows:
EUs : q1w
s
h + (q2 + q3)w
s
s   q3cf   cm  0;
EUa : q1w
a
h + (q2 + q3)w
a
s + z  0
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The Participation Constraints ensure that the expected utility from participating to the
game is at least much as choosing the outside option,wo, which is normalized to 0:
The Principals objective is to minimize her expected costs subject to the participation
constraints stated above and the limited liability constraints below:
wij  0 where i : s; a and j : h; s; n
The limited Liability Constraint protects the Supervisor and the Agent from making
payments to the Principal. The Principal cannot o¤er wages that will require the Supervisor
and the Agent to actually "pay" to the Principal.
The additional constraint in this problem is:
wss   cf  wsn, which ensures that the Supervisor fabricates soft evidence.
Thus, the Fabrication Incentive seems to induce the desired outcome {Monitor,Corrupt,Fabricate}.
The Principal has to o¤er wages such that the expected utility from fabrication is at least as
large as the expected utility from not fabricating.We assume that if the payo¤s from fabri-
cating and not fabricating is equal, the Supervisor will choose the option which the Principal
wants him to choose.
Finally we have Nash Equilibrium conditions:
q1w
s
h + (q2 + q3)w
s
s   q3cf   cm  wsn
q1w
a
h + (q2 + q3)w
a
s + z  was   (1  )fa
The Nash Equlibrium conditions satises that the actions taken by the players in the
hierarchial structure is deviation-proof. That is to say, the wage structure o¤ered must
ensure that neither the Supervisor nor the Agent are better o¤ by deviating from their
respective strategies.
The problem can be stated as follows:
min q1(w
s
h + w
a
h) + (q2 + q3)(w
s
s + w
a
s ) + h
subject to
wij  0 (LLC)
q1w
s
h + (q2 + q3)w
s
s   q3cf   cm  0 (PCs)
q1w
a
h + (q2 + q3)w
a
s + z  0 (PCa)
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wss   cf  wsn (FC)
q1w
s
h + (q2 + q3)w
s
s   q3cf   cm  wsn (NE-Cs)
q1w
a
h + (q2 + q3)w
a
s + z  was   (1  )fa (NE-Ca)
Proposition 1 The PCs is not binding, it holds for any non-negative wage,wsj . This is
observed from NE-Cs coupled with LLC. Also observe that, LLC couple with the fact that z
is non-negative imply that the Agents participation constraint cannot be binding.
Note that the rst two terms in the RHS of NE-Cs also appear in the Principals cost
objective. Given the fact that wsn  0, we can choose wsn = 0 and wss = cf . So, the fabrication
constraint holds and it is binding. With these wages, NE-Cs will reduce to
q1w
s
h + (1  q1   q3)cf   cm  0
Setting wsh =
cm q2cf
q1
will satisfy all the constraints as well as minimizing the costs.
Observe that, the solution is not unique. For instance, for " small enough,
wsh =
cm q2cf
q1
  "
wss = cf +
"q1
1 q1
wsn = 0 is also a solution.
The wage structure we have obtained is optimal. To show this, suppose on the contrary
that they are not.This means there are other wages that generate smaller costs for the
Principal.
Let us choose wsn > 0, in this case w
s
s = cf + w
s
n, provided that FC is binding. The w
s
h
that sat·Ises constraints and minimizes the cost function will be: wsh =
cm+q1wsn q2cf
q1
is higher
than the wage we have obtained above. So contradiction occurs, the wages are optimal.
The wage structure for the {Monitor,Corrupt,Fabricate} case is as follows:
Ws = (
cm+q1wsn q2cf
q1
; cf ; 0)
Wa = (0; 0; 0)
Therefore, the Principals minimized cost is;
ECp : cm + q3cf + h (I)
17
3.1.2 Inducing the strategy prole {Monitor,Corrupt,Not Fabricate}
The only di¤erence from the rst case is in the fabrication constraint. The Supervisor
monitors the Agent, who chooses corruption, however the Supervisor does not fabricate
evidence in the case of "no evidence". In that setting the expected cost of the Principal will
be as follows:
ECp : q1(w
s
h + w
a
h) + q2(w
s
s + w
a
s ) + q3(w
s
n + w
a
n) + h
The Supervisors and the Agents expected utility are now stated as:
EUs : q1w
s
h + q2w
s
s + q3w
s
n   cm,
EUa : q1w
a
h + q2w
a
s + q3w
a
n + z
The rst di¤erence is the introduction of positive probability of receiving the "no evi-
dence" wage for both the Supervisor and the Agent. Also, the Supervisor will not bear the
cost of fabrication in that case.
Thus the Principals problem is:
min q1(w
s
h + w
a
h) + q2(w
s
s + w
a
s ) + q3(w
s
n + w
a
n) + h
subject to
wij  0
wsn  wss   cf
q1w
s
h + q2w
s
s + q3w
s
n   cm  wsn
q1w
a
h + q2w
a
s + q3w
a
n + z  was + (1  )wan
Following the same logic above, the optimal wage prole is:
Ws = (
cm
q1
; 0; 0)
Wa = (0; 0; 0)
With the cost function:
ECp : cm + h (II)
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Under the absence of collusion,and the players are not randomizing, the Principal will be
better o¤by o¤ering wages that will induce the {Monitor,Corrupt,Not Fabricate} equlibrium
because th costs in II is smaller that those in I. Observe that, because 0  q3  1 and
cf > 0,we have cm + h  cm + q3cf + h. Since the Principals objective is to minimize
her expected cost, she will prefer the no fabrication case to the fabrication case. She will
indi¤erent between the two options when the probability of reaching "no evidence", q3, hence,
fabrication, is equal to zero.
The solution to the Pure Strategy Nash Equlibria in the absence of collusion is intuitive.
Since the Principal cannot force the Supervisor and the Agent to make positive transfers to
her, she should o¤er wages that are greater than or equal to zero, in accordance with the
limited liability constraint. Also, the Supervisor and the Agent have discretion over their
decision on whether to participate in the game or not. They will participate only if their
expected utility in participating the game is at least as high as their outside option, which
has been normalized to zero in our model. In that case, the Principal should o¤er wages
that will compensate for the cost of monitoring and fabrication. The Principal will prefer to
induce the equilibrium with no fabrication hence, where she does not incur any fabrication
cost.
3.2 Mixed Strategy Nash Equlibria
In this part of the analysis we analyze two distinct types of equlibria. First we analyze the
equlibria in which one of the players (the Supervisor or the Agent) has a strict preference
over one action while the other player is indi¤erent. Then we will move on with the equilibria
where both players are indi¤erent.We have come up with six di¤erent equlibria which will
be analyzed thorougly.
3.2.1 Inducing the strategy prole {Supervisor Monitors and Fabricates,Agent
Randomizes}
Suppose that the Principal is interested in inducing an equilibrium in which the Supervisor
will monitor with probability one, and if her e¤orts end up in no evidence she fabricates evi-
dence, whereas the Agent is indi¤erent between engaging in corruption or not. His expected
utility from both actions is the same.
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The Principals expected cost is as follows:
ECp = q1(w
s
h + w
a
h) + (q2 + q3)(w
s
s + w
a
s ) + (1  )(wss + was ) + (1  )(1  )fp + h
where  is the probability of the Agent being corrupt and fp is the monetary equivalent
of the disutility to the Principal due to framing of an honest agent.
The Principals problem can be formulated as follows:
min q1(w
s
h + w
a
h) + (q2 + q3)(w
s
s + w
a
s ) + (1  )(wss + was ) + (1  )(1  )fp + h
subject to
wij  0
wss   cf  wsn
q1w
s
h + (q2 + q3)w
s
s + (1  )wss   cf (q3 + (1  )(1  ))  cm  wsn (NE-Cs)
q1w
a
h + (q2 + q3)w
a
s + z = w
a
s   (1  )fa (NE-Ca)
Observe that the rst three terms at the RHS of NE-Cs is also a part of the Principals
expected cost function. Re-arranging the NE-Cs we obtain;
q1w
s
h + (1  q1)wss   cf (q3 + (1  )(1  ))  cm  wsn
We claim that wsn = 0 is optimal. To show this suppose that w
s
n = " where " > 0. Then
the constraints pertaining to the Supervisor become;
wss  cf + " (1)
q1w
s
h + (1  q1)wss  cf [q3 + (1  )(1  )] + cm + " (2)
An optimal wage structure must satisfy these two constraints,so it is obvious that whether
(1) and/or (2) is binding or not, reducing " towards zero violates neither (1) nor (2), and
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it can only reduce the Principals cost by allowing for reduction in wss and/or w
s
h. Thus,
wsn = 0 is optimal.
Consider now, (1) and (2), where wsn = 0. We now claim that (2) must be binding, if (1)
is not, i.e., when wsh and w
s
s are chosen optimally, (2) must hold with equality if w
s
s > cf .
Again, to show a contradiction, suppose that under the optimal wage structure (2) is not
binding. The expected wage payments are:
Z = q1w
h
s + (1  q1)wss > cf [q3 + (1  )(1  )] + cm > 0;
where Z is the expected wage payments.
Then however, reducting wsh will reduce Z, contradicting the optimality of w
s
h. Thus (2)
must be binding if wss > cf .
It is possible that under optimal wages NE-Cs is not binding when wss = cf . In particular,
if cm  cf [q2 + (1  )]; wsh = 0; wss = cf and wsn = 0 satises wss  cf and makes NE-Cs
nonbinding. To see this subsititute these wages into NE-Cs to get:
(1  q1)cf  cf [q3 + (1  )(1  )] + cm
Rearranging the terms yields, cf [q2 + (1  )]  cm.If this condition holds with strict
inequality the Principal cannot reduce wages further by reducing wsh; w
s
s and w
s
n.
Thus, expected wage payments are as follows;
EWs = cf [q3 + (1  )(1  )] + cm (if cf (q2 + (1  ))  cm)
EWs = cf (1  )q1 (if cf (q2 + (1  )) > cm)
The Agents optimal wages are,wah = 0, w
a
s =
z + (1  )fa
q1
.To see this, note that NE-Ca
can be written as,z+(1 )f
a
q1
= was   wah.
The minimal wages that satisfy this conditions are those stated above. Turning to the
Principals expected cost, the expected wage payments to the agent are:
EWa = (z + (1  )fa)( 1
q1
  )
The Principals expected minimized cost will be as follows:
cf [q3 + (1  )(1  )] + cm + (z + (1  )fa)( 1
q1
  ) + (1  )(1  )fp + h (III)
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Observe that the Principals cost function is increasing in  if h++ q3cf > (1 )(fa+
fp) + q1cf + z
2
Under that condition the Principal will be better o¤ as  reduces towards zero. Note
that,  is the probability of agent being corrupt. Thus,  reducing towards zero means that
the Principal set up wages such that the Agent will choose to be non-corrupt. In that limit,
Principals cost will be as follows:
cf (1  ) + cm + 1
q1
(z + (1  )fa) + (1  )fp
Otherwise if the above condition does not hold, the Principals cost function is decreasing
in . So the Principal will be better o¤ by o¤ering wage structures such that, under the
monitoring Supervisor the Agent decides upon corruption.The Principals cost in the limit
when  ! 1 is;
cm + q3cf + (
1  q1
q1
)(z + (1  )fa) + h
3.2.2 Inducing the Strategy Prole {SupervisorMonitors and Not Fabricates;Agent
Randomizes}
In this case, we will characterize solutions in an enviroment where the Supervisor does not
choose to fabricate evidence.The Principals expected cost is stated as follows:
ECp :
q1(w
s
h+w
a
h)+q2(w
s
s+w
a
s )+q3(w
s
n+w
a
n)+(1 )(wss+was )+(1 )(1 )(wsn+wan)+h
Thus, the Principals problem is:
min q1(w
s
h+w
a
h)+q2(w
s
s+w
a
s )+q3(w
s
n+w
a
n)+(1 )(wss+was )+(1 )(1 )(wsn+
wan) + h
subject to
wij  0
2This observation can be done by taking partial derivative of the cost function with respect to , or any
other parameter of interest.
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wsn  wss   cf
q1w
s
h + q2w
s
s + q3w
s
n + (1  )wss + (1  )(1  )wsn   cm  wsn (NE-Cs)
q1w
a
h + q2w
a
s + q3w
a
n + z = w
s
s + (1  )wan (NE-Ca)
As shown in subsection 3.2.1, wsn = 0 is optimal.
Next, we claim that the fabrication constraint is not binding in any solution to the
Principals problem. Thus, suppose that wsn and w
s
h are chosen optimally. Now,to establish
a contradiction, suppose that the fabrication constraint is binding. The constrainst will be
arranged as follows:
wsn = w
s
s   cf (3)
q1w
s
h + (q2 + (1  ))wss  cm (4)
The optimal wages o¤ered by the Principal to the Supervisor should satisfy the constraints
(3) and (4) as well as the limited liability constraint. Observe that, setting wsn = 0, will
result in setting wss = cf , which is the wage that makes the Supervisor indi¤erent between
two strategies, fabricate and not fabricate. Assume that the Supervisor chooses the strategy
which the Principal wants to induce. Now the expected wage payments are:
Z = q1w
s
h + (q2 + (1  ))cf  cm
From the remark we made earlier we assumed cf < cm, therefore we can conclude that
reducing wss towards zero will result in smaller expected wage payment without violating (4),
but contradicting with the optimality of wss. So, the fabrication constraint is not binding.
So, fabrication constraint becomes,
wsn > w
s
s   cf
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By far, we established that wsn = 0 is optimal. Under that wage scheme, setting w
s
s = 0
is optimal. Under the optimal wages, wsn = 0; w
s
s = 0, NE-Cs becomes,
q1w
s
h  cm (NE-Cs)
The Principal aims to minimize her expected cost, hence she prefers to o¤er the smallest
wsh that satises NE-Cs. Setting w
s
h =
cm
q1
is optimal.
To show this suppose that, wsh =
cm
q1
+ " and " > 0: NE-Cs is still satised, however with
strict inequality, and the expected wage payment becomes:
Z = q1"+ cm  cm
Note that, reducing wsh towards
cm
q1
will result in smaller expected wage payment without
violating NE-Cs, but contradicting with the optimality of wsh.
The optimal wage structure for the Supervisor, that satises all the constraints and
minimize the expected disutility of the Principal is as follows: Ws : ( cmq1 ; 0; 0).
Consider now the Agents incentive scheme. Rearranging the NE-Ca will yield the fol-
lowing optimal wage structure for theAgent,Wa = (0 ; 0; z1  q3 ).
The Principals expected minimized cost is:
cm   z ++h+ (1  ) z
1    q3 (IV)
Taking the partial derivative of (IV) with respect to the parameter, , we get: h  z
So, we can say that the Principals cost function is increasing in  (the probability of
corruption) if the monetary equivalent of the harm done by corruption, h, to the Principal
is higher than the monetary equivalent of benet from corruption for the Agent, z:
It is natural to assume that h > z. Then the Agent should be induced not to choose
corruption, as close to  = 0 as possible to minimize the Principals cost. It is intiutive to
say that, when the harm done by the corruption is too high, then the Principal will take
all the measures, i.e. set wages such that, to decrease the probability of the Agent being
corrupt. She can set the wages such that  will be arbitrarily close to zero, and in the limit
the Principals cost function will be:
cm + (1  )( z
1    q3 )
24
On the other hand, in the unlikely case of h < z,  = 1 will minimize the Principals cost.
Then the Principals could simply not use the Supervisor and pay the Agent a at wage.
We do not analyze the case where the Supervisors strict preference is not to monitor,
because in that case the Agent never randomizes and always chooses corruption.A pure
strategy outcome that is not an equlibria occurs.
Next we will analyze the cases where the Agent has strict preferences whereas the Su-
pervisor is indi¤erent.
3.2.3 Inducing the strategy prole {Supervisor Randomizes and Fabricates,
Agent is Corrupt}
Next suppose that the Principal is interested in inducing an equilibrium in which Agent
chooses corruption with probability one, and the Supervisor randomizes with a positive
probability,p whether to monitor or not. In that case;
ECp : pq1(w
s
h + w
a
h) + (pq2 + pq3)(w
s
s + w
a
s ) + (1  p)(wsn + wan) + h
So, the Principals problem is formulated as follows:
min pq1(w
s
h + w
a
h) + (pq2 + pq3)(w
s
s + w
a
s ) + (1  p)(wsn + wan) + h
subject to
wij  0
wss   cf  wsn
q1w
s
h + (pq2 + pq3)w
s
s   q3cf   cm = wsn (NE-Cs)
pq1w
a
h + (pq2 + pq3)w
a
s + (1  p)wan + z  pwas   pfa(1  ) + (1  p)wan (NE-Ca)
The optimal wage structure for the Agent should minimize the expected disutility of the
Principal, as well as satisfying;
wij  0 (5)
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z + pfa(1  )  (p  pq2   pq3)was   pq1wah (6)
To characterize the Agents incentive scheme, rearranging NE-Ca we will obtain:
z + pfa(1  )  (p  pq2   pq3)was   pq1wah (NE-Ca)
We assumed that, it is natural to assume that, the monetary equivalent of benet from
corruption to the Agent, z, and the monetary equivalent of harm done by framing an honest
agent as a corrupt one, fa are strictly greater than zero. LLC coupled with the assumption
that z > 0 and fa > 0, the optimal incentive scheme for the Agent is:
W a = (0; 0; 0)
Next, we characterize the optimal wage structure for the Supervisor. The characterization
follows the steps adopted in the subsections 3.2.1 and 3.2.2.
Ws = (
cm q2cf
q1
; cf ; 0)
The Principals expected cost function is:
pcm + pq3cf + h (V)
Obviously, the cost function is increasing in the probability of the Supervisor monitoring.
The Principal will be better o¤when the probabiliy of monitoring is arbitrarily close to zero,
but not zero.
One can think the situation as such, the Principal aware of the fact that the Agent is
corrupt, can o¤er the lowest wage possible to the Agent. So the Agent chooses to participate.
Since being able to minimize the expected payment to the Agent by setting at wages,
without regarding the outcomes, the Principal will refrain from setting wages that will induce
the Supervisor to monitor. The Principal simply chooses not to delegate her monitoring duty
to the Supervisor. She simply does not prefer to monitor the Agent, who is corrupt with
probability one. The Principals cost function will be reduced to:
h
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3.2.4 Inducing the Strategy Prole {Supervisor Randomizes and Not Fabri-
cates,Agent is Corrupt}
The Principals problem is as follows;
min pq1(w
s
h + w
a
h) + pq2(w
s
s + w
a
s ) + pq3(w
s
n + w
a
n) + (1  p)(wsn + wan) + h
subject to
wij  0
wsn  wss   cf
q1w
s
h + q2w
s
s + q3w
s
n   cm = wsn
pq1w
a
h + pq2w
a
s + pq3w
a
n + (1  p)wan + z  pwas + p(1  )wan + (1  p)wan
The characterization of optimal incentive structure follows the steps we adopted in pre-
vious subsections. The optimal wage structures that minimizes the expected disutility and
satises the constraints are;
Ws = (
cm
q1
; 0; 0)
Wa = (0; 0; 0)
The Principals expected cost will be realized as;
pcm + h (VI)
The decision of not fabrication reduces the cost of the Principal, with respect to the
previous case. However, note that there is no need to hire the Supervisor to perform
monitoring when the Agent is one hundred percent corrupt. It is costly for the Principal to
induce monitoring when monitoring does not change the Agents decision to monitor.
We do not analyze the case where the Agent is not corrupt, because in that case best
response of the Supervisor will be not to monitor, because monitoring will be costly for both
the Supervisor and the Principal.
Last, we will analyze the cases where none of the players have strict preferences over the
actions in their strategy set.
3.2.5 Inducing the strategy prole {Supervisor Randomizes and Fabricates,
Agent Randomizes}
We now consider the case where both players are indi¤erent among their actions. The
expected cost of the Principal can be written as;
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ECp : pq1(w
s
h + w
a
h) + (pq2 + pq3)(w
s
s + w
a
s ) + p(1  )(wss + was ) + (1  p)(wsn + wan) +
p(1  )(1  )fp + h
The Principals problem is:
min pq1(w
s
h + w
a
h) + (pq2 + pq3)(w
s
s + w
a
s ) + p(1  )(wss + was ) + (1  p)(wsn + wan) +
p(1  )(1  )fp + h
subject to
wij  0
wss   cf  wsn
q1w
s
h + (q2 + q3)w
s
s + (1  )wss   q3cf   (1  )(1  )cf   cm = wsn (NE-Cs)
pq1w
a
h + (pq2 + pq3)w
a
s + (1  p)wan + z = pwas + (1  p)wan   p(1  )fa (NE-Ca)
Observe that the rst three terms at the RHS of NE-Cs is also part of the the Principals
expected cost function. Re-arranging NE-Cs we obtain;
q1w
s
h + (1  q1)wss   wsn = cm + ((1  )(1  ) + q3)cf
The optimal wage for the Supervisor who reports no evidence is zero. To establish
contradiction, suppose that wsn = " where " > 0. Then the constraints pertaining to the
Supervisor become;
wss  cf + " (7)
q1w
s
h + (1  q1)wss = cm + ((1  )(1  ) + q3)cf + " (8)
An optimal wage structure should satisfy those two constraints, it is obvious that whether
(7) is binding or not, reducing " towards zero violates neither (7) nor (8) and it reduces the
Principals cost by allowing for reduction in wss and/or w
s
h. Thus, w
s
n = 0 is optimal.
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Consider now, (7) and (8), where wsn = 0. Now, we claim that (7) is binding and the
optimal wage for the Supervisor who reports soft evidence is cf . Suppose that (7) is not
binding, fabrication constraint is reduced to;
wss > cf
Following the reduced fabrication constraint set wss = cf + ", where " > 0. Now the
NE-Cs becomes;
q1w
s
h + (1  q1)(cf + ") = cm + ((1  )(1  ) + q3)cf
Observe that reducing wss towards cf decreases the expected cost function for the Princi-
pal. That contradicts with the optimality of wss; thus the fabrication constraint is binding.
Next, rearranging NE-Cs given that wsn = 0 and w
s
s = cf , we have;
q1w
s
h = cm + ((1  )(1  ) + q3   (1  q1))cf which can be written as
q1w
s
h = cm + ((  q2)  ))cf
The optimal incentive scheme for the Supervisor is:
W s = (
cm + cf ((  q2)  )
q1
; cf ; 0)
Now consider the Agents incentive scheme, rearranging NE-Ca we will obtain;
z + p(1  )fa = pq1(was   wah)
Observe that, the Agents optimal incentive scheme can be written as:
W a = (0;
z + p(1  )fa
pq1
; 0)
Under the optimal wage structure, the expected cost function for the Principal will be:
pcm+(z+ p(1 )fa)( 1
q1
  )+ p(1  )(1 )fp+ h+ pcf (   (1  q3)+1) (VII)
By tedious but simple partial derivation of the function with respect to the parameters p
and , we observe that the function is increasing in p. On the other hand partial derivative
with respect to  will result in following expression;
h  (z + pcf + pq2cf ;+pq1cf + p(1  )fa)
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Once again, it is natural to assume that harm done by the corruption is much more than
the expression (z+ pcf + pq2cf ;+pq1cf + p(1 )fa /), hence the function is increasing in .
In order to minimize her expected cost, the Principal must set wages such that the Agent is
induced to be not corrupt,  is arbitrarily close to zero but not equal to zero due to fact that
agent being not corrupt is not an Nash equlibria. In the limit, where both the probabilities
p and  are arbitrarily close to zero, the Principals cost function will be:
z
q1
In the unlikely case of h being smaller than the expression (z + pcf + pq2cf ;+pq1cf +
p(1 )fa, then the cost function will be decreasing in . If this is the case, then the Agent
is induced to be corrupt and the Supervisor is induced to choose not monitor. It is simply
unnecessary for the Principal to monitor the Agent, she must o¤er at wages to the Agent
and must not hire the Supervisor at all.
3.2.6 Inducing the strategy prole {Supervisor Randomizes and Not Fabri-
cates,Agent Randomizes}
In this last case, we will deal with the enviroment where the randomizing Supervisor will
choose not to fabricate evidence when encountered no evidence.
The problem we are dealing with is as follows;
min pq1(w
s
h+w
a
h)+ pq2(w
s
s +w
a
s )+ pq3(w
s
n+w
a
n)+ p(1  )(wss +was )+ p(1  )(1 
)(wsn + w
a
n) + (1  p)(wsn + wan) + h
subject to
wij  0
wsn  wss   cf
q1w
s
h + q2w
s
s + q3w
s
n + (1  )wss + (1  )(1  )wsn   cm = wsn (NE-Cs)
pq1w
a
h + pq2w
a
s + pq3w
a
n + (1  p)wan + z = pwas + p(1  )wan + (1  p)wan (NE-Ca)
30
The characterizations of the incentive scheme for the Supervisor and the Agent are follow-
ing the steps we have adopted in subsection 3.2.5. Using the methods adopted, the optimal
wage structure is:
Ws : (
cm
q1
; 0; 0)
Wa : (0; 0;
z
p(1  q3))
Under the optimal wage structure,the Principals expected cost function will be as follows:
pcm + h+ (
1
p
  ) z
1    q3   z (VIII)
Now, rst take the partial derivative of the cost function with respect to the parameter,
p. The resulting expression will be:
cm   zp2(1  q3)
Under the condition that  + q3 is greater than 1 then the cost function is said to be
increasing in p: In other words, if the probability of reaching soft evidence when the Agent is
honest added to the probability of reaching no evidence when the Agent is corrupt is greater
than 1, then the function is increasing probabilty of monitoring. That is plausible because
that means that the probabilitys of reaching no evidence when agent is corrupt and reaching
soft evidence when the Agent is honest is relatively high than theri counterparts. In either
of the case, a montioring Supervisor will be costly to the Principal, so she prefers to induce
a strategy where the Supervisor is induced to monitor with a probabilty p, as close to zero
as possible.
Otherwise, if 1    q3 is positive, we can conclude that the cost function is decreasing
in p. That is to say, reaching no evidence in case of corruption and soft evidence in case
of honesty is smaller with respect to the previous condition. The Principal may be willing
to induce the outcome where the Supervisor monitors with expectation that the Supervisor
can be able to report corruption with high or soft evidence.
Taking the partial derivative of (VII) with respect to the parameter, , we get: h  z
So, we can say that the Principals cost function is increasing in  (the probability of
corruption) if the monetary equivalent of the harm done by corruption, h, to the Principal
is higher than the monetary equivalent of benet from corruption for the Agent, z:
It is natural to assume that h > z. Then the Agent should be induced not to choose
corruption, as close to  = 0 as possible to minimize the Principals cost. It is intiutive to
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say that, when the harm done by the corruption is too high, then the Principal will take
all the measures, i.e. set wages such that, to decrease the probability of the Agent being
corrupt.
The analysis in the absence of collusion concludes that the equlibria in which the Agent is
corrupt with probabality one is not interesting for our research question. In those cases, the
Principal is simply better o¤ by extracting the Supervisor from the game and o¤ering at
wages to the Agent whom she knows is corrupt. Introducing monitoring and the Supervisor
to the model in those cases only achieves to increase the expected cost of the Principal.
The Principal is wiling to induce the strategies where either the Agent or both of the
players randomize. The equlibria and their related cost functions are as follows:
 {Monitor, Not Fabricate, Randomize)
cm + h  z + (1  ) z
1    q3 (IV)
 {Randomize,Not Fabricate,Randomize}
pcm + h  z + (1
p
  ) z
1    q3 (VIII)
Observe that as p approaches to 1, (VII) comes closer to the (IV). Under the assumption
that 1      q3 is strictly positive and the probability of monitoring is arbitrarily close to
1,the Principal is willing to induce the equlibrium {Randomize,Not Fabricate, Randomize} if
(1  p)cm is greater than the the expression (1  1p) z1  q3 . Observe that, p being arbitrarily
close to 1 decreases the cost function by reducing cm. On the other hand
1
p
is greater than
1, this amplies the expression z
1  q3 with respect to (IV). So if the e¤ect of decreasing the
cm by setting the wages that induces the Supervisor to monitor, with probability p is more
than the e¤ect of amplifying the expression z
1  q3 , then the Principal prefers (VIII) over
(IV).
Now consider the case where p is arbitrarily close to zero, again under the assumption
that 1    q3 is strictly positive. The cost function (IV) is smaller than the cost function
(VIII). Although, cm becomes insigniciant as p approaches to zero in the cost function
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(1      q3 is strictly positive (VIII), the expression (1p   ) z1  q3 skyrocketed to innity
because in the limit 1
p
converges to innity as p approaches to zero.
If 1    q3 is strictly negative, since 0 < 1 < p in the latter equlibria, we can coclude
that 1
p
> 1 always. Couple that information with the fact that (1
p
  ) z
1  q3 has a negative
sign, then (VIII) is always smaller than (IV). The Principal prefers to induce equlibrium
{Randomize,Not Fabricate,Not Fabricate}.
All along the analysis, the Principals problem has been to minimize her expected disu-
tility function subject to the constraints structured by the enviroment. All the cases we
have analyzed have been nalized with di¤erent cost functions to the Principal. In the cases
where one of the players have strict preferences over their actions and the other is random-
izing, we conclude that the minimum cost function is achieved when the Supervisor is not
fabricating. Likewise, when both players are randomizing, the Principal will prefer to induce
the equilibria where the Supervisor chooses not to fabricate. Inducing fabrication will de-
nitely increase cost function, due to fabrication constraint, at least by cf for the Supervisor.
On the other hand, the introduction of the fabrication will result in the high probability
of soft evidence realization and soft evidence wages will be paid more likely. So with this
information, the Agent who is indi¤erent between corruption and honesty is expected to
choose honesty. However, with the optimal incentive schemes we have characterized, the
Agent will decide upon corruption. When the Agent decides upon honesty when fabrication
is induced by the Principal, he will bear the cost of framing,fa. So, the Principal have to
make sure that the di¤erence between expected payo¤, under fabrication, from corruption
and no evidence wage in case of honesty at least as much as the cost of framing,fa. The
wages we have characterized do not satisfy that condition. The Agent is better o¤ when
he decides upon corruption if the Principal is fabricating. There does not exist any cost
associated with framing of a corrupt agent. Also, the cost function is not increased only by
cf , but by the framing cost inicted upon the Principal, fp.
Let us demonstrate our point by comparing the cost functions related to the fabrication
and not fabrication in the equlibria we have analyzed above.
 {Monitor, Not Fabricate, Randomize)
cm + h  z + (1  ) z
1    q3 (IV)
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Let us digress that cost function, rst we will look at the expected wage payment to the
Supervisor
EWs = cm
Next, the expected wage payment to the Agent
EWa = (1  ) z
1    q3   z
 {Monitor,Fabricate, Randomize)
cf [q3 + (1  )(1  )] + cm + (z + (1  )fa)( 1
q1
  ) + (1  )(1  )fp + h (III)
Let us digress that cost function, rst we will look at the expected wage payment to the
Supervisor
EWs = cf [q3 + (1  )(1  )] + cm
Next, the expected wage payment to the Agent
EWa = (z + (1  )fa)( 1
q1
  )
 {Randomize,Not Fabricate,Randomize}
pcm + h  z + (1
p
  ) z
1    q3 (VIII)
Let us digress that cost function, rst we will look at the expected wage payment to the
Supervisor
EWs = pcm
Next, the expected wage payment to the Agent
EWa = (
1
p
  ) z
1    q3   z
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 {Randomize,Fabricate,Randomize}
pcm+(z+ p(1 )fa)( 1
q1
  )+ p(1  )(1 )fp+ h+ pcf (   (1  q3)+1) (VII)
Let us digress that cost function, rst we will look at the expected wage payment to the
Supervisor
EWs = pcm + p((1  q1) + ((  q2)  )cf
Next, the expected wage payment to the Agent
EWa = (z + (1  )fa)( 1
q1
  )
It is obvious that the expected cost functions pertaining to fabrication cases is higher
than that of pertainig to no fabrication cases.
Observe that, the results are not robust. They are solely dependent on our construction
of the costs and rewards.First, we have assumed that fabrication is something costly and
then we have assumed that cost of framing is only inicted when the Agent is honest.
4 The Analysis in The Existence of Collusion
4.1 The Ex-Post Collusion Analysis
Ex-post collusion is an agreement between the agent and the supervisor upon realization
of an outcome of the game, whereby the two parties nd a mutually benecial swtich to
a di¤erent outcome, upsetting the Principals objective. This agreement involves transfers
between the parties.
That is to say,when the monitoring occurs and the outcome is realized, if the Supervisor
reports the outcome, the Principal will pay the wages o¤ered at the beginning of the game.
If the Agent persuades the Principal not to reveal the evidence, then they will both receive
the no evidence wage. That kind of agreement only occurs if there exists a positive surplus
that can be gained through the agreement.
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The modelling of ex-post collusion is as follows: After the last stage of the game, the
Supervisor observes outcomes. The Agent, if corrupt, o¤ers a bribe to the Supervisor not to
reveal the information to the Principal. In the thesis, we will not deal with the bargaining
game to determine the bribe, but assume if there is exists a surplus from collusion, collusion
occurs. In the collusion literature, ex-post collusion is characterized whether to report the
outcome or not. However, in our case ex-post collusion can be either not reporting hard
evidence or soft evidence. We do not consider a collusion that incorporates the reporting
hard evidence as soft evidence. Since, hard evidence is dened to be the proof of corruption,
we assume that the Supervisor cannot reveal it as something less in comparison.
To prevent ex-post collusion, the Principal has to make sure that the sum expected
payo¤ from reporting the "true" evidence is at least as large as the payo¤s from reporting
no evidence. That is called collusion proofness constrant. We will characterize the optimal
collusion proof incentive schemes for the equilibrium we have found in non-cooperative game
above.
Proposition 2 The incentive scheme o¤ered by the Principal,in the {Monitor,Not Fabri-
cate,Randomize} equilibrium is not ex-post collusion proof.
To prove the proposition above, let us write the Principals problem pertaining to the
equilibri¬um once again.
min q1(w
s
h+w
a
h)+q2(w
s
s+w
a
s )+q3(w
s
n+w
a
n)+(1 )(wss+was )+(1 )(1 )(wsn+
wan) + h
subject to
wij  0
wsn  wss   cf
q1w
s
h + q2w
s
s + q3w
s
n + (1  )wss + (1  )(1  )wsn   cm  wsn (NE-Cs)
q1w
a
h + q2w
a
s + q3w
a
n + z = w
s
s + (1  )wan (NE-Ca)
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wsh + w
a
h  wsn + wan (Collusion Proofness for Hard Evidence)
wss + w
a
s  wsn + wan (Collusion Proofness for Soft Evidence)
The incentive schemes obtained in the non-cooperative Nash Equlibrium is as follows:
W s = ( cm
q1
; 0; 0) and W a = (0; 0; z
1  q3 )
Observe that, the incentive schemes of the non-cooperative Nash Equlibrium do not
satisfy the collusion proofness for soft evidence constraint. Not reporting soft evidence is
protable for the Supervisor and the Agent because there exists a surplus from collusion.
To characterize the collusion proof incentive scheme for the equilibrium, rearrange NE-Ca
to obtain:
z = (  q2)wss + (1    q3)wan   q1wah
We claim that, wah = 0 is optimal. To show that, suppose w
a
h = " and " > 0, then NE-Ca
becomes
z + q1" = (  q2)wss + (1    q3)wan
This will result in higher was and/or w
a
n wages and increases the expected cost functio of
the Principal. So, reducing wah to zero is optimal.
Now, given that wah = 0, NE-Ca becomes;
z = (  q2)wss + (1    q3)wan
Observe that, we need to make sure that the sum expected payo¤ from reporting soft
evidence is at least as large as reporting no evidence. So setting wan = 0 and w
a
s =
z
 q2
is optimal collusion proof incentive scheme. Note that, the solution is not unique you can
increase wan by /" and decrease w
a
s by
"
 q2 unless you violate the collusion proofness for soft
evidence constraint.
So the collusion proof incentive schemes are; W s = ( cm
q1
; 0; 0) and W a = (0; z
 q2 ; 0):
The cost function associated with that cooperative equilibria is:
cm   z +  z
  q2 + h
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Proposition 3 The incentive scheme o¤ered by the Principal,in the {Randomize,Not Fab-
ricate,Randomize} equilibrium is not ex-post collusion proof. The ex-post collusion proof
scheme is; W s = ( cm
q1
; 0; 0) and W a = (0; z
p( q2) ; 0):
The proof to that proposition follows the proof we have done in Proposition 2.
The cost function for the cooperative equlibria is:
pcm   z +  z
  q2 + h
Notice that to prevent collusion the Principal has to make sure that no additional sur-
pluses can be created by switching from one stratgey to the other. Although we are not
analyzing the bargaining game between the Supervisor and the Agent,it is obvious that
ex-post collusion proof incentive schemes provide no room for extra surpluses that can be
divided among the players.
4.2 Ex-Ante Collusion
In that section we will analyze whether to incentive schemes we have characterized for the
ex-post collusion proofness can prevent ex-ante collusion Ex-ante collusion is an agreement
where the Supervisor chooses not to monitor the Agent in return for a "transfer" from
the Agent, as well as leaving the ex-post collusion possibilities that can occur in case of
monitoring.
The modelling of ex-ante collusion is as follows: At the beginning of the game, the Agent
o¤fers a bribe to the Supervisor to persuade him not to monitor. If the Supervisor accepts
the bribe, he chooses not to monitor and both of the players receive no evidence wage.
To prevent ex-ante collusion the Principal has to make sure that the sum of expected
payo¤s from monitoring and reporting the "true" evidence is at least as large as the sum
of expected payo¤s from not monitoring. We will characterize the ex-ante collusion proof
incentive schemes for the non-cooperative game above.
Proposition 4 The incentive scheme that satises the ex-post collusion proofness is ex-ante
collusion proof.
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First we will look at the case,{Monitor, Not Fabricate, Randomize} equilibrium, assuming
ex-post collusion proofness is satised, the Principals problem can be writtten as follows;
min q1(w
s
h+w
a
h)+q2(w
s
s+w
a
s )+q3(w
s
n+w
a
n)+(1 )(wss+was )+(1 )(1 )(wsn+
wan) + h
subject to
wij  0
wsn  wss   cf
q1w
s
h + q2w
s
s + q3w
s
n + (1  )wss + (1  )(1  )wsn   cm  wsn (NE-Cs)
q1w
a
h + q2w
a
s + q3w
a
n + z = w
s
s + (1  )wan (NE-Ca)
q1(w
s
h+w
a
h)+q2(w
s
s+w
a
s )+(1 )(wss+was )+q3(wsn+wan)+(1 )(1 )(wsn+wan) cm  wsn+wan
(Ex-Ante Collusion Proofness)
The ex-post collusion proof incentive scheme is; W s = ( cm
q1
; 0; 0) and W a = (0; z
 q2 ; 0):
Let us plug the wages into the ex-ante collusion proofness constraint. The reulting expression
is;
z
 q2 (q2 + (1  ))  0.
So we can claim that the ex-post collusion proof incentive scheme satises the ex-ante
collusion for this equilibrium.
Next, consider the {Randomize, Not Fabricate, Randomize} equilibrium, assuming ex-
post collusion proofness is satised, the Principals problem can be writtten as follows;
min pq1(w
s
h+w
a
h)+ pq2(w
s
s +w
a
s )+ pq3(w
s
n+w
a
n)+ p(1  )(wss +was )+ p(1  )(1 
)(wsn + w
a
n) + (1  p)(wsn + wan) + h
subject to
wij  0
wsn  wss   cf
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q1w
s
h + q2w
s
s + q3w
s
n + (1  )wss + (1  )(1  )wsn   cm = wsn (NE-Cs)
pq1w
a
h + pq2w
a
s + pq3w
a
n + (1  p)wan + z = pwas + p(1  )wan + (1  p)wan (NE-Ca)
pq1(w
s
h+w
a
h)+pq2(w
s
s+w
a
s )+p(1 )(wss+was )+pq3(wsn+wan)+p(1 )(1 )(wsn+wan)+(1 p)(wsn+wan) pcm  wsn+wan
(Ex-Ante CP)
Insert the ex-post collusion proof incentive scheme,W s = ( cm
q1
; 0; 0) andW a = (0; z
( q2) ; 0),
and check for the ex-ante collusion proofness. The resulting expression is;
z
(  q2)(pq2 + p(1  )  0
Next we will look at the case, where {Randomize, Not Fabricate, Randomize} is the
equilibrium, assuming ex-post collusion proofness is satised, the Principals problem can be
writtten as follows;
min pq1(w
s
h+w
a
h)+ pq2(w
s
s +w
a
s )+ pq3(w
s
n+w
a
n)+ p(1  )(wss +was )+ p(1  )(1 
)(wsn + w
a
n) + (1  p)(wsn + wan) + h
subject to
wij  0
wsn  wss   cf
q1w
s
h + q2w
s
s + q3w
s
n + (1  )wss + (1  )(1  )wsn   cm = wsn (NE-Cs)
pq1w
a
h + pq2w
a
s + pq3w
a
n + (1  p)wan + z = pwas + p(1  )wan + (1  p)wan (NE-Ca)
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pq1(w
s
h+w
a
h)+pq2(w
s
s+w
a
s )+p(1 )(wss+was )+pq3(wsn+wan)+p(1 )(1 )(wsn+wan)+(1 p)(wsn+wan) pcm  wsn+wan
(Ex-Ante CP)
Insert the ex-post collusion proof incentive scheme,W s = ( cm
q1
; 0; 0) andW a = (0; z
p( q2) ; 0),
and check for the ex-ante collusion proofness. The resulting expression is;
z
(  q2)(q2 + (1  ))  0
The intuition behind the result is as follows, by preventing ex-post collusion we make
sure that the sum of expected payo¤s from reporting any evidence is as least as large as
reporting no evidence. Since, in our framework, reporting no evidence and not monitoring
leads to the same no evidence wage and the wages we o¤er compensate for the monitoring
cost, ex-ante collusion can be prevented with ex-post collusion proof incentive schemes.
5 Concluding Remarks
This thesis incorporates the incentive schemes o¤ered in order to prevent corruption in a
three layer hierarchy. The thesis also characterizes the optimal incentive schemes in an
enviroment where fabrication of evidence, only soft evidence, is possible. While doing so, we
have assumed that a costly monitoring and fabrication technology is adopted. In section 3,
we have started with analyzing the pure strategy Nash Equlibria. We have concluded that
the Principal will be better o¤when she o¤ers the incentive scheme which induces "Monitor,
Corrupt and Not Fabricate" strategies.
Then we continue with analyzing the mixed strategy Nash Equlibria. This analysis also
concludes that the Principal is better o¤ when the Supervisor decides not to fabricate. The
result which is contradictory to our intiution is due to the fact that fabrication is a costly
technology, framing of an honest agent will inict cost both on the Agent and the Principal.
Also, analysis shows that the Principal can o¤er at wages to the Agent when the Supervisor
chooses to monitor. That is to say, if there is a positive probability that the Supervisor will
monitor and the Agent is corrupt, the Principal can o¤er the smallest wage that satisfy all
the constraint to the Agent. That is due to the fact that, there is a strictly positive private
benet gained from corruption by the Agent.
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In section 4, we analyze the cooperative Nash Equlibria. We start the analysis to check
whether the optimal incentive schemes we have characterized in the previous section is ex-
post collusion proof or not. The section conludes that the equlibria, {Monitor, Not Fabri-
cate and Corrupt} and {Randomize,Not Fabricate and Corrupt}are ex-post collusion proof.
While on the other hand {Monitor,Not Fabricate and Randomize} and {Randomize, Not
Fabricate and Randomize}are not ex-post collusion proof. After we have characterized the
ex-post collusion proof incentive schemes for that equlibria, we analyze the ex-ante collu-
sion proofness. The thesis concludes that, given that ex-post collusion proofness is satised,
ex-ante collusion can be prevented.
We recommend that, fabrication costs, harms and constraints can be redened to char-
acterize the incentive schemes in upcoming research in the area.
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